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Abstract 
This chapter seeks to throw new light on the emergence of the Chinese economic middle class 
using data from the China Household Income Project from 2002, 2007, and 2013. We find that 
between 2002 and 2013 China’s income distribution was transformed from a pyramid shape, 
with a majority having rather low income, to a more olive shape, as the middle class emerged. 
Defining “middle class” as having an income high enough not to be regarded as poor but also 
low enough not to be regarded as rich if living in a high-income country, we find that the share 
of China’s population that was middle class was extremely small in 2002, larger but still less 
than 10 percent in 2007, but it expanded rapidly from 2007 to 2013 to become one-fifth of 
China’s population, equivalent to roughly 250 million people.  China’s middle class remains 
largely urban and is concentrated in the East; only a small minority of rural households and of 
rural migrants living in urban areas is middle class. We use simulations to investigate whether 
the growth of China’s middle class reflects across-the-board income growth versus a 
redistribution of income to the middle, and to project growth in the size of the middle class to 
2020. If all household incomes grow uniformly by 6.5 percent per annum to 2020, then China’s 
middle class will almost double in size and in 2020 a majority of urban residents, but only 13 
percent of rural residents, will be classified as middle class. We examine the characteristics of 
China’s middle class and find it to be distinctive in terms of its sources of income, location of 
residence, savings and consumption patterns, education, and Communist Party membership.   
 
Keywords: China, middle class, income distribution 
 
JEL Classification: D31, O15, O53, P36 
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I. Introduction 
 
One of the most significant global changes in this millennium is the substantial increase in the 
number of households and persons in China with lives in economic terms similar to those in the 
developed world. Most Chinese households no longer worry about how to meet daily living costs 
and most have savings for a rainy day. Most own a home, and a growing number own a car and 
can afford to take regular holidays away from home. This change is clearly revealed in studies of 
worldwide income distribution. Milanovic (2016), for example, reports that the largest relative 
gains in real per capita income by global income levels between 1988 and 2008 took place at the 
middle and at the very top of the world’s income distribution. To a considerable extent, the gains 
in the middle are the result of the recent changes in China.  In contrast, income growth was much 
slower in the segments between the middle and the top, reflecting slow income growth of 
middle-class households in rich countries.   
This chapter aims to throw new light on the emergence of the Chinese economic middle 
class. We define “middle class” based on the level of a household’s disposable income.  More 
specifically, we define “middle class” as having an income high enough not to be regarded as 
poor but also low enough not to be regarded as rich in a high-income country.  This approach 
allows us to consider the Chinese middle class with an external lens, relative to notions of the 
middle class in the developed world, which we believe is ultimately the long-term objective of 
China’s development process.  
As a first task, we study the growth of the Chinese middle class from 2002 to 2007 and 
then to 2013. We do this for China, and then separately for urban residents, rural-to-urban 
migrants, and rural residents. As a second task, we simulate how the size of the middle class will 
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develop by 2020 under the assumption of uniform income growth of 6.5 percent per annum. The 
results of this second task allow us to evaluate the extent to which China’s population will attain 
the ranks of the developed-world middle class over the medium term. The third task of this 
chapter is to investigate to what extent the middle class is distinct and differs from other classes.  
We do this using detailed information from the 2013 survey of the China Household Income 
Project (CHIP).  
The emerging middle class in China has been the subject of writings by Chinese 
researchers, most of whom lean toward the long tradition of class analysis in the field of 
sociology. In contrast, there have been few attempts in China to map the middle class based on 
analysis of household disposable income or consumption data. In our literature research, we have 
come across only three such studies. Yuan, Wan, and Knor (2012) use the CHIP rural data for 
1988, 1995, 2002, and 2007, and classify a rural household as belonging to the middle class if its 
per capita daily expenditures are in the interval of purchasing power parity (PPP) US$ 4 to US $ 
20. Using this definition, the authors find that the middle class in rural China grew from 3 
percent in 1988 to 53 percent in 2007. Bonnefond, Clément, and Combarnous (2015) use data 
from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) for the years from 1989 to 2009 to study 
the urban middle class using four different definitions, giving some priority to setting the lower 
cutoff point at 10,000 RMB per year and the upper cutoff point at the 95th income percentile. A 
cluster analysis for 2009 using household variables indicates that the urban middle class is 
composed of a significantly higher proportion of households whose head belongs to the 
professional and technical worker category, the administrative and executive category, or the 
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office staff category. Somewhat more than two-fifths of middle-class households contain 
pensioners.1  
The third study is most similar to ours. Different from the previous two studies, Chen and 
Qin (2014) study China as a whole, and use the CHIP data for 1995 and 2002 and data from the 
China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) for 2010 and 2012. Households with consumption 
expenditures in the range of PPP US$ 10 to US$ 20 per person per day are classified as upper or 
global middle class. According to this definition, the Chinese middle class increased from 1 
percent in 1995 to 13 percent in 2012. Not surprisingly, the authors find that the proportion of 
households classified as middle class was highest among urban residents who have an urban 
household registration (hukou), followed by migrants living in urban areas, and finally by rural 
residents.   
Turning to our results, according to our definition we find that in 2002 middle-class 
persons in China numbered 12 million, a very small minority of the population. Growth in the 
middle class since 2002 has been rapid. The number of middle-class persons increased to 95 
million in 2007 and further to 254 million in 2013. In the latter year, one-third of urban persons, 
but only a small minority of rural and rural-to-urban migrant persons, was middle class. A 
simulation exercise investigates the role of income growth versus redistribution in contributing to 
this expansion of the middle class. For the period from 2007 to 2013 we find that if income 
growth for all persons had been uniform and equal to the average, then the overall expansion of 
China’s middle class would have been about the same as what in fact occurred; however, the 
sectoral urban/rural composition of the middle class would have been somewhat different.      
                                                          
1 Bonnefond and Clément (2014) use the same definition and data to study body weight among Chinese 
urban middle-class members. The authors conclude that only one subcategory (“the new middle class”— 
the highest earners and the best educated) is relatively well protected from obesity.   
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China’s middle-class households differ from those with lesser means in various respects, 
including their savings patterns, sources of income, ownership of consumer durables, geographic 
distribution, and education.  We also find that in 2013 the middle class was disproportionately 
represented in China’s Communist Party. Looking ahead by means of a simulation that assumes 
incomes for all households will grow at the uniform rate of 6.5 percent per annum (equal to the 
planned growth of GDP per capita), we project that by 2020 the Chinese middle class will 
roughly double in size, and as much as 60 percent of the urban population will belong to the 
middle class. In contrast, the rural middle class in 2020 will remain relatively small.     
In the next section, we discuss how the term “middle class” has been used by policy 
makers in China and in academic research on China. Different from most of the other literature 
on China’s middle class, our definition of “middle class” takes a global perspective. Here we 
follow the approach in the literature on the international distribution of income, which we review 
in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the data and our operational assumptions. Section 5 reports our 
findings on the emergence of China’s global middle class from 2002 to 2013; Section 6 presents 
an analysis of the growth of China’s middle class over time, with projections to 2020. In Section 
7 we examine the characteristics of China’s middle class. Section 8 sums up our study and draws 
some conclusions.   
 
II. The Meaning of “Middle Class” in Policy Making and Studies on China 
 
For many years the Communist Party leadership, policy makers, and researchers in China 
discussed class in the Marxist-Leninist terms of workers, peasants, and intellectuals. The party-
state did not acknowledge any social, economic, or political role for the middle class, and the 
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ultimate goal was to create “a classless society.” During the reform era, however, views began to 
evolve, and at the Sixteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2002 General 
Secretary Jiang Zemin announced the goal to “control the growth of the upper stratum of society, 
expand the middle, and reduce the bottom.” Thereafter, the CCP developed a state-sponsored 
discourse on the middle class. The new objective was to achieve an “olive-shaped” middle-class 
society, in which the bulk of the population would be economically comfortable (xiaokang) and 
society would be harmonious. Goodman writes that this notion of a middle-class society is an 
aspiration rather than a carefully thought-out idea, but identification of the middle class as a 
potential driver of change is clear. “Individuals are being encouraged to pursue new ‘social 
norms of middle class identity often defined around consumer practices.’ The new model citizen 
is someone with high cultural capital and the economic capacity to consume” (Goodman 2014: 
27).    
The growth of the Chinese middle class can have significant consequences internationally 
as well as domestically. A growing middle class means a growing market for consumer goods 
and services. It also has potential implications for the geopolitical situation. The history of the 
Western countries is sometimes used to demonstrate that the growth of the middle class is related 
to the introduction and deepening of political democracy. For example, new research using panel 
data from many developed and developing countries finds evidence in support of the hypothesis 
that growth in the size of the middle class promotes institutional reform and democratic diffusion 
(Loayza, Rigolini, and Llorente 2012; Chun et al. 2016).  
Whether and how growth of a Chinese middle class will affect China’s political system, 
however, is far from clear. For example, Tang (2011) finds that members of the Chinese middle 
class (defined by occupation and self-identification) pay greater attention to politics and engage 
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more than those with lesser means in informal/personal activities in response to conflicts with 
government policies or officials. Other studies, however, conclude that the behavior of the 
middle class in China as an aggregate is not significantly different from that of other classes 
when it comes to political activities that require greater civic engagement or confrontation with 
the political system.2 If the CCP is able to successfully capture the interests of the middle class, 
then growth of the Chinese middle class will not necessarily challenge China’s political system 
in a fundamental way. Indeed, our data reveal that CCP membership disproportionately belongs 
to China’s middle class (see Section 6). Nevertheless, even if growth of the middle class in China 
leaves the political system intact, a larger proportion of middle-class persons in society could 
change the political priorities.     
Since the beginning of the new millennium, many sociologists have written about the 
middle class in China.  Li Cheng (2010) lists eleven prominent Chinese researchers who have 
studied the middle class and their representative works. Work published in 2002 by Lu Xueyi, 
then director of the Institute of Sociology at the Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), is 
considered a landmark study for two reasons. First, for the first time Lu Xueyi categorizes most 
of the working class as belonging to the lower or lower-middle strata. Such a categorization is 
new, both politically and ideologically. Second, Lu Xueyi identifies a middle stratum comprised 
of cadres, managers, private entrepreneurs, technical clerks, and private small-business owners. 
Using data from 1978, 1988, and 1991 he estimates the growth among this group of people. Li 
                                                          
2 Tang and Unger (2013) write, “The Chinese educated middle class has, as a whole, become a bulwark of 
the current regime. As a consequence, regime change or democratization should not be expected any time 
soon. The rise of China’s educated middle class blocks the way.” Nathan (2016) writes, “What middle-
class persons dread is an economic or military crisis or an internal power struggle that triggers a 
breakdown of order. It is the fear of such a crisis that explains why a middle class that increasingly 
embraces liberal values still supports an authoritarian regime.” 
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Cheng (2010) also writes that in later work Lu Xueyi reports that the proportion of middle-class 
persons in the Chinese population increased from 15 percent in 2001 to 23 percent in 2009.  
Sociologists prefer to define the middle class based on occupation and employment, and 
they often base the classification on more than one criterion. Different researchers have proposed 
many varying definitions of middle class, which of course yields different pictures of the middle 
class and has led to many debates. An issue in the sociological debates over the middle class is 
whether the middle class is merely a statistical category or a class in a sociological sense. To be a 
class in a sociological sense, members of the middle class must develop a coherent identity, class 
culture, and sociopolitical attitudes and values, and perhaps may take some class-based political 
actions. Several authors stress the heterogeneity of the Chinese middle class rather than referring 
to the middle classes as one single middle class (Li Cheng 2010). Less attention, with the 
possible exception of Mackerras (2005), has been paid to the possible ethnic diversity of the 
Chinese middle class.  
Economists and business researchers tend to focus on the relationship between the middle 
class and consumption. Growth of the middle class in China is considered the driver behind the 
changing consumption patterns and the rising demand for consumer goods. Regular visitors to 
China have seen the stunning changes in the kinds of goods that are now offered to those who 
have the means. China has turned into the largest market in the world for personal cars, and its 
market for wine has increased dramatically. Similarly, China has seen a very rapid increase in 
independent tourism (Chio 2014; Oakes 2016).   
Middle-class status is also associated with housing and home ownership. During the 
planning era, almost all urban households lived in rental apartments provide by their work-units. 
Rents were very low, and so was the quality. This description no longer holds. Policies initiated 
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by the government in the 1990s gradually introduced privatization of urban housing, as tenants in 
urban China were given opportunities to buy their apartments at prices typically lower than those 
in the emerging market. Today, the rate of home ownership in China is very high (Sato, Sicular, 
and Yue 2013).  Moreover, with a boom in the construction industry and the development of 
residential real-estate markets, many more households now live in housing that is similar in 
terms of space and quality to that of the middle class in rich countries. Some members of the 
upper segment live in gated communities, visibly separated from people with lesser means (for 
example, see Li Zhang [2010]).   
In the literature on the middle class in the developed countries, studies have defined 
“middle class” based on household disposable income, usually in relation to other households 
within the same country. The various chapters in Gornick and Jäntti (2013) contain a wide 
variety of definitions along these lines.3 For example, a middle-class household can be defined as 
having an income in the interval from 75 percent to 125 percent of the median. The only example 
in this tradition that we are aware of for China is Anderson et al. (2016), which uses data from 
six urban provinces and an econometric approach to define the poor, lower-middle class, upper-
middle class, and the rich. One feature of such an approach is that its definition of the middle 
class is local, without reference to any universal standards or criteria. Such is not the case for the 
literature we will discuss in the next section, and to which our study belongs.      
 
III. The Meaning of the Global Middle Class 
 
                                                          
3 The book contains chapters by seventeen authors, and in it one can find twenty-one different definitions 
of “middle class.” 
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For several decades researchers at the World Bank have defined poverty based on a global 
poverty line measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). Since October 2015 this global 
poverty line has been set at US$ 1.9 PPP per person per day, based on the latest round of PPP 
estimates from the International Comparison Program in 2011.4 The choice of the cutoff for this 
global poverty line is based on an approximation of the poverty lines used in the poorer countries 
in the developing world.  
Several studies now also propose global cutoffs for middle and upper levels of the 
income distribution. However, there is no consensus on where exactly to set these cutoffs, that is, 
how much income a household should have to be considered a member of the middle class, let 
alone the upper class.5   
One approach is to define the “middle class” as starting at the income level where 
poverty ends. By this definition, people living in households with income just above the world 
poverty line are classified as middle class. Among the more influential papers using this 
approach is Banerjee and Duflo (2008: 26), which defines the middle class as living at between 
US$ 2 and US$ 10 per day based on the 1993 PPP. Using microdata from thirteen low- and 
middle-income countries, these authors investigate a number of aspects of the middle class and 
conclude that “Nothing seems more middle class than the fact of having a stable, well paid job. 
…The middle class … spend more on health and education of their children as well as on their 
own health.” A similar, but not identical, approach is taken by Ravallion (2010), who defines the 
developing world’s middle class as those who are not poor according to the world poverty line, 
                                                          
4 https://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPINT/Resources/270056-1183395201801/Summary-of-Results-and-
Findings-of-the-2011-International-Comparison-Program.pdf.  Accessed March 24, 2017.  See also Ferreira et al. 
(2016). 
5 In the relatively large literature on top-income earners, they are typically defined as those who belong to 
the upper one-tenth or upper one-hundredth of the income distribution. See, for example, Atkinson, 
Piketty, and Saez (2011).    
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but would be considered poor if they lived in a high-income country. The latter is operationalized 
using the U.S. poverty line, which was set at about US$ 13 a day in 2005.  
A view espoused by other researchers, and shared by this study, is that a global poverty 
line based on poverty lines in the world’s poorest countries is too low to be the starting point of 
the global middle class. Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002), for example, define the middle class as 
people having an income between the mean of Brazil and Italy. Bhalla (2007) postulates that 
“middle class is where the poor end in the rich world” and puts the cutoff at US$ 10 PPP per 
person per day. Following this, Kharas (2010), in a much-cited study, defines the global middle 
class as those with daily expenditures in the interval from US$ 10 to US$ 100 PPP per person. 
His lower cutoff is set equal to the average poverty line in Portugal and Italy, which is similar to 
the poverty line in the United States. His upper cutoff is selected as twice the median income of 
Luxembourg, the richest country in the European Union.     
Unlike Bhalla (2007), Kharas (2010) uses data from 145 countries covering 99 percent of 
the world’s population to estimate the size and regional composition of the world’s middle class 
and, like Bhalla, he projects future change. Kharas concludes that in 2009 1.8 billion persons 
belonged to the world’s middle class. A majority (54 percent) lived in Europe or North America, 
28 percent lived in Asia Pacific, 7 percent lived in Central and South America, and 6 percent 
lived in the Middle East and North Africa, whereas only 2 percent lived in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The results from his simulations indicate that the size of this middle class could increase to 3.2 
billion by 2020 and 4.9 billion by 2030. Almost all this projected growth will come from Asia; 
the size of the middle class in North America is projected to remain roughly constant as the 
inflow to the middle class from households with lesser means will be offset by the outflow of 
middle-class households to the rich class.  
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[Table 3.1 about here] 
As explained more fully in the next section, for our analysis we define four classes: 
“poor,” “lower class,” “middle class,” and “upper class.”  “Poor” refers to standards of living 
that are poor by developing-country standards as measured by the global poverty line.  “Lower 
class” refers to a standard of living above this global poverty line but is still considered poor by 
the standards of developed countries.  “Middle class” refers to a standard of living that is 
considered not poor but also not rich in the developed countries. Table 3.1 summarizes our 
classification system and relates it to the terminology found in the literature, which we see as 
differing between studies that use developing versus developed countries as the frame of 
reference.   
 
IV. Data and Operational Assumptions 
 
We use data from the rural, rural-to-urban migrant and urban samples in the CHIP surveys for 
the income years 2002, 2007, and 2013.6 The samples were drawn from the larger household 
survey samples of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) that are used to produce Chinese 
official statistics on household income and consumption. Our 2002 sample contains 63,911 
individuals, of whom 20,624 are from the urban sample, 37,969 are from the rural sample, and 
5,318 are from the migrant sample. The 2007 sample contains 89,804 individuals, of whom 
29,553 are from the urban sample, 51,847 are from the rural sample, and 8,404 are from the 
migrant sample. The 2013 sample has 57,821 individuals, of whom 18,668 are from the urban 
sample, 37,090 are from the rural sample, and 2,063 are from the migrant sample. The provincial 
                                                          
6 For an introduction to the household income surveys in China including the CHIP, see Gustafsson, Li, 
and Sato (2014).   
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coverage of the CHIP samples to some extent changes across the years of the survey, as do the 
sampling probabilities. To control for this, in much of the analysis we apply the two-level 
(region x urban/rural/migrant) population-based sampling weights developed by the CHIP team.7    
Following much previous work by the CHIP project, we use a definition of household 
income that is based on NBS disposable or net household income data, adjusted to include 
imputed rents from owner-occupied housing and implicit subsidies on subsidized urban rental 
housing. This definition of household income is in line with international practices. The NBS 
definition of income changed in 2013. For 2007 we carried out our calculations using the original 
and the new income definitions, and we found very minor difference in our results. Therefore, 
for simplicity, here we report our estimates based on the pre-2013 income definition for 2002 
and 2007 and based on the 2013 income definition for 2013.  
Income is the sum of various income components including wage earnings, net business 
income, property income, imputed rental income on owner-occupied housing, and transfers net 
of income taxes. We divide household income by the number of household members, adjusted 
according to an equivalence scale to obtain income per capita in terms of equivalent persons.  
For this purpose, we employ the equivalence scale used by Eurostat, with the first adult 
equivalent to 1.0, additional adults equivalent to 0.5, and persons less than 14 years of age 
equivalent to 0.3.  Using the urban consumer price index for the urban and the migrant samples 
and the rural consumer price index for the rural sample, we express income in constant prices 
                                                          
7 We use CHIP sampling weights that assume a middle estimate of the size of the rural-to-urban migrant 
population. 
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over time. In the calculations reported here, we do not adjust for spatial price differences within 
China.8  
[Table 3.2 about here] 
In our analysis, we use four classes, which we define by applying three cutoffs to the data 
(Table 3.2). The lowest cutoff, set at PPP US$ 2 per person per day, defines the poor and it 
relatively closely follows the recent practice of the World Bank when defining global poverty. 
To convert to RMB, we use the PPP conversion factor of 3.76 for 2013, which is provided by the 
OECD based on estimates from the International Comparison Program in 2011.9  From this, we 
obtain the cutoff in RMB per day, which is 7.52 for 2013.  
 The second cutoff separates the lower class from the middle class.  Here we use as the 
cutoff the level of income per capita that separates the poor from the non-poor in the EU in 2013. 
Following the practice of the EU, we put the poverty line at 60 percent of the median income.  
Information on the median income for sixteen member countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and United Kingdom) is reported by Eurostat 2013 at 18,219 € per person per year.10 
We then apply the PPP conversion factor, which was 0.83 in 2013. This yields a cutoff for 2013 
of PPP US$ 36, or RMB 135.36 per person per day (Table 3.2).   
                                                          
8 We carried out the calculations with adjustments for the spatial price differences, which somewhat 
changed the relative shares of the urban/rural/migrant populations in the middle class, but otherwise did 
not substantially change our overall findings. 
9 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPINT/Resources/270056-1183395201801/Summary-of-Results-and-Findings-
of-the-2011-International-Comparison-Program.pdf.  Accessed March 24, 2017. 
10 We use the median for fifteen EU countries because it is covers those countries that have been longer-
term, stable members of the EU and because this is the only multiple-country median that Eurostat reports 
for the years prior to 2005, thus allowing us to conduct some sensitivity analyses using data from earlier 
years.  The median for the EU-15 is close to that for the EU-18, as well as for Germany, EU’s largest 
member-state.  In 2013 the median income of the EU-15 was 5 percent higher than the median income of 
the EU-18 and 7 percent lower than the median income in Germany.  
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Definition of the middle class also requires a cutoff between the middle class and the 
upper class.  For this, we follow some other studies in the literature and use 200 percent of the 
median household income per capita as observed in the fifteen EU countries, which in 2013 
corresponds to PPP US$ 120, or RMB 451.2 per person per day.  We carried out our analysis 
using alternative cutoffs, such as 150 percent and 175 percent of the EU median income.  The 
results were not sensitive to the choice of this upper cutoff because the proportion of Chinese 
households with incomes above these levels is very small. 
Although our procedure for setting the cutoffs for the middle class relative to the median 
income in the EU is conceptually clear, some details of the calculation may influence our 
estimates of the size of the middle class in China. First, Eurostat data on median incomes is 
expressed in terms of an equivalence scale that assumes a value of 1.0 for the first adult 
individual in the household, 0.5 for other adults, and 0.3 for each person 14 years old and 
younger. Such a procedure is typically not applied in low- and middle-income countries, such as 
China, and it is not applied by the World Bank in setting the global poverty line.  The 
justification for not using the equivalence scale for low- and middle-income countries is that the 
scope for economies of scale in low- and middle-income countries is limited because, for 
example, food consumption makes up a much larger proportion of consumption than it does in 
rich countries. 
In view of the fact that our cutoffs for the middle class are based on estimates of the 
median income that use an equivalence scale, we apply the same equivalence scale to the 
Chinese income data when estimating the share of China’s population that is middle class versus 
upper class.  Because the global poverty line is based on estimates of income per person, not per 
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equivalent person according to an equivalence scale, we simply use income per capita when 
estimating the share of China’s population that is poor versus lower class. 
Second, comparisons over time require a decision as to whether to keep the cutoffs 
constant or to let them change over time, that is, whether to use fixed or moving goal posts.  We 
have chosen to fix the cutoff goal posts at 2013 levels.  In other words, we define middle class 
with reference to the recent (2013) standard of being neither poor nor rich in the EU, and our 
analysis investigates change in China’s middle class over time according to this recent standard.  
Of course, this is not the only possible approach. An alternative is to allow the goal posts to 
change and to base the cutoffs for 2002 and 2007 on the situation in the EU countries in 2002 
and 2007, respectively.  The results for this alternative approach, as shown in the Appendix, are 
for the most part similar to those using fixed goal posts because income growth in the fifteen EU 
countries from 2002 to 2013 was relatively modest.      
 
V. Growth of the Chinese Middle Class from 2002 to 2013 
 
Before turning to the results, we comment on how changes in the size of the middle class are 
related to trends in income and income inequality, topics addressed in other chapters of this 
volume. When the middle class is defined relative to absolute cutoffs, as is the case here, then the 
middle class will expand when income growth for segments of the population below the middle 
class is sufficient for them to cross into the middle class from below the cutoff, and to do so 
more rapidly than any outflows from the middle class. Such an expansion of the middle class 
may or may not reduce inequality. If most of the population is middle class, then the movement 
of lower-income individuals into the middle class will likely reduce inequality.  If most of the 
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population is poor or low-income, however, and if the middle class is located near the top end of 
the income distribution, then movement of some lower-income individuals into the middle class 
could lead to rising inequality.  These hypothetical situations suggest that the relationship 
between changes in the size of the middle class and inequality is complex.  
As we will see below, China in 2002 began with an overwhelming majority of 
households in the poor and lower classes, very few in the middle class, and extremely few in the 
upper class. Thereafter, the country experienced rapid economic growth that was not equally 
shared.  During the period from 2002 to 2007 average income growth was rapid and the middle 
class expanded, but the middle class remained a relatively small proportion of the population.  At 
this time, growth of China’s middle class was accompanied by rising inequality.  From 2007 to 
2013 incomes continued to grow and China’s middle class continued to expand, however, during 
these years inequality began to decline, as reported in other chapters in this volume.   
 The relationship between inequality and growth of the middle class in China has been 
rather different from that in the developed world. In the 1990s many countries in the developed 
world had large middle classes, but in recent decades they have experienced unequal income 
growth that mainly benefited those in the upper segments of the income distribution.  Income 
growth for those in the middle and lower segments has been slow. Consequently, many 
developed countries have experienced a shrinking of the middle class accompanied by rising 
inequality.    
[Figure 3.1 about here] 
Figure 3.1 shows how China’s income distribution has changed over time in relation to 
our cutoffs between the poor, lower, middle, and upper classes. For ease of comparison across 
time, income in all years is expressed in constant 2013 prices. In 2002 the income distribution is 
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concentrated at the left side of the graph and resembles a “pyramid” shape.  Most of the income 
distribution is to the left of the cutoff for the middle class, and much of it is below the poverty 
line.  Moving to 2007 and 2013, the income distribution shifts to the right.  Over time, the 
relative size of the poor class declines and the lower and middle classes grow.     
These findings are in line with the objectives of China’s policy makers, as discussed in 
Section 2: Transformation from a society with an income distribution shaped like a pyramid to 
one shaped like an olive, with few at the bottom, many in the middle, and few at the top.  China’s 
income distribution has indeed evolved toward an “olive” shape, although the pyramid’s peak 
remains distinct and is in the lower class, well below the cutoff for the middle class.   
[Figure 3.2 about here] 
[Table 3.3 about here] 
Growth of the middle class is visualised in a slightly different way in Figure 3.2, which 
plots the cumulative distribution of income.  The cumulative distribution of income shows the 
proportion of the population with incomes below the level of income at each point on the 
horizontal axis.  For example, at the lower cutoff for the middle class (135.36), the curve on the 
graph shows the proportion of the population that belongs to the poor and lower classes.  Figure 
3.2 has four panels, one for China as a whole, and one each for urban residents, rural residents, 
and migrants. Each panel shows the cumulative distribution of income for 2002, 2007, and 2013, 
with incomes for all years in constant 2013 prices. 
One can see that from 2002 to 2007 and again to 2013, the cumulative income 
distribution shifts downward and to the right. Such shifts indicate that over time the proportion of 
China’s poor- and low-income population declined, whereas that with middle and higher 
incomes expanded.  The shift is most noticeable for the urban sector.  For the rural sector, the 
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curves shifted more modestly and remain largely to the left of the cutoff for entering the middle 
class. 
Table 3.3 provides the corresponding estimates of the share of the population in each 
class by year based on our definitions.  The Chinese middle class grew from only 1 percent in 
2002 to 7 percent in 2007 and further to 19 percent in 2013. In terms of numbers of people, the 
middle class contained fewer than 12 million Chinese residents in 2002. The size of the middle 
class increased to 64 million residents in 2007 and expanded rapidly to no fewer than 254 million 
residents in 2013.  While in percentage terms China’s middle class in 2013 remained a relatively 
small share of the population, in absolute terms and relative to the size of the world’s middle 
class, it was large.11   
Concurrently with this growth of the middle class, China’s poverty rate decreased from 
27 percent in 2002 to 11 percent in 2007 and further to 4 percent in 2013. The lower class 
expanded from 2002 to 2007, when it exceeded 80 percent of China’s population, and then 
declined to 77 percent. Despite the growing importance of China’s middle class, in all years it 
was substantially smaller than the lower class, which constituted a large majority of China’s 
population.  As of 2013, then, an overwhelming majority of China’s population did not yet 
belong to the global middle class. 
The upper class was virtually non-existent in 2002, and in 2013 it remained small at only 
0.5 percent of China’s population. The share of China’s population belonging to the global 
upper-income class thus remains exceedingly small; however, in absolute terms the number is 
still sizable (6.8 million).  In view of the small proportion of the population above the highest 
cutoff, in the following sections we focus our attention on the poor, lower, and middle classes. 
                                                          
11 Kharas (2010) estimates a global middle class of 1.8 billion in 2009. 
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As one would expect, growth of China’s middle class is seen most clearly in the urban 
areas. Among urban residents, the share of the population in the middle class increased from 2 
percent in 2002 to 34 percent in 2013.12  The share of migrants who were middle class expanded 
from 1 percent in 2002 to 19 percent in 2013. In rural China, the share of the middle class in 
2013 was still low at only 4 percent. Rural China, however, has been characterized by a rapid 
reduction of poverty, from 40 percent to 7 percent, and by the expansion of the lower class from 
60 percent to 89 percent of the population between 2002 and 2013.    
[Table 3.4 about here] 
How do our estimates of the size and development of the middle class relate to what 
others have reported? Table 3.4 summarizes several previous estimates. As Yuan, Wan, and 
Khor (2012) used the lowest cutoffs, it comes as no surprise that they report higher proportions 
of middle-class persons in rural China than we or Chen and Qin (2014) report.  Our estimates of 
the size of the middle class in China as a whole are similar to those reported by Chen and Qin 
(2014) and Kharas (2010). Kharas (2010) finds that less than 12 percent of the Chinese 
population was middle class in 2009, which is the same as our estimate of 12 percent in 2013. 
Chen and Qin (2014) report a middle-class share of 13 percent in 2012.  The preferred estimate 
of Bonnefond, Clément, and Combarnous (2015) for 2009 is substantially larger; however, this 
reflects their low cutoff for entering the middle class.  Their preferred cutoff of only 10,000 
RMB per year translates to only 27 RMB per day, much lower than our cutoff of 135 RMB per 
day.  
                                                          
12 In the Appendix, we report results from a sensitivity analysis in which we set the second and third 
cutoffs in accordance with the changes in the median incomes in the fifteen EU countries developed from 
2002 and from 2007, i.e., using moving goal posts. This alternative approach gives a growth of the middle 
class in urban China from 2002 to 2007 that is faster than that reported in this section and a growth 
between 2007 and 2013 that is slower than that reported in this section.  
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Only Chen and Qin (2014) report the size of the middle class separately for the rural, 
urban, and migrant sectors.  For the most recent year (2012 for Chen and Qin, 2013 for us), we 
find a smaller rural middle class and larger urban and migrant middle classes than they do.13    
 
VI. Analyzing the Growth of the Chinese Middle Class 
 
To what extent is the growth of China’s middle class due to growth in average incomes versus 
redistribution toward the middle of the income distribution?  Both growth and redistribution have 
taken place during the period of our analysis. As shown in other chapters in this volume, from 
2007 to 2013 household income growth in China was broad-based. We also know, however, that 
some redistribution took place, because from 2007 to 2013 income growth was more rapid in the 
lower end and in the middle than at the top of the income distribution, as well as in the poorer 
rural sector than in the richer urban areas.  
In order to explore the role of average income growth versus redistribution, we carry out 
a simulation exercise that begins with the 2007 distribution of income and assumes that from 
2007 to 2013 all persons experienced the same annual growth rate of income.  We set the 
uniform annual growth rate at 7.97 percent, equal to the average rate of growth in per capita 
household income during this period.  This simulation yields a hypothetical distribution of 
income for 2013 that assumes no redistribution of income. We then compare the size of the 
middle class in this hypothetical distribution to that in the observed income distribution for 2013.   
[Table 3.5 about here] 
                                                          
13 We note that our estimates are based on income, whereas those of Chen and Qin (2014) are based on 
consumption expenditures. Another difference is that the estimates of Chen and Qin (2014) are for 
households, whereas ours are for individuals.   
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Interestingly, we find that the size of China’s middle class in the hypothetical distribution 
is virtually the same as that observed in 2013. We also find, however, that this result masks some 
differences in the composition of the hypothetical middle class versus the observed middle class. 
Using the assumption of uniform growth yields a middle class in urban China that is 
substantially larger (45 percent, not 34 percent), and a middle class in rural China that is 
somewhat smaller (2 percent, not 4 percent) than that which was in fact observed in 2013. We 
conclude that although redistribution did not affect growth in the overall size of China’s middle 
class from 2007 to 2013, it increased the proportion of the middle class that was rural as opposed 
to urban.  These results reflect the relatively rapid growth of rural incomes vis-à-vis the growth 
of urban incomes during this period. 
A similar analysis going back further to the period from 2002 to 2007 also does not alter 
the share of the middle class in the national population.  The simulation, however, yields a much 
larger reduction in rural poverty than actually occurred.  A uniform growth rate would have 
reduced the poverty rate in rural China to 9 percent in 2007, as compared to the much higher 
observed poverty rate of 21 percent in 2007. These results reflect the relatively slow growth of 
rural income vis-à-vis urban income during this period.        
[Table 3.6 about here] 
How large will China’s middle class grow in the future? We answer this question by 
projecting forward from 2013 to 2020 under an assumption of uniform 6.5 percent income 
growth per year for all households. We use 6.5 percent growth for the projection because China’s 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016‒2020) established a 6.5 percent target GDP growth rate and 
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because this growth rate is in line with standard forecasts, e.g., the IMF predicts China’s GDP 
growth will be 6.5 percent in 2016 and gradually slow to 6.0 percent in 2020.14   
The results from this exercise are reported in Table 3.6. A comparison with the numbers 
in Table 3.3 indicates that in the seven years from 2013 to 2020, the share of the middle class in 
China will almost double from 19 percent to 36 percent of the population, or from 254 million to 
509 million persons (assuming population growth of 0.5 percent per annum). By 2020 most of 
urban China will be middle class, with 60 percent of urban residents so classified. Reflecting the 
persistent gap in income between the urban and rural areas, in 2020 rural China will still be 
overwhelmingly lower class, with only 13 percent of rural inhabitants classified as middle 
class.15  In the near future, then, China’s middle class will remain a mainly urban phenomenon. 
 
VII. Characteristics of China’s Middle Class 
 
In this section, we use the 2013 survey data to identify the distinctive characteristics of China’s 
middle class in comparison to the lower income and poor classes. First, we note that the Chinese 
middle class contains relatively high savers, with an average savings rate of 35 percent.16 Figure 
3.3 shows the relationship between the savings rate and income using a plot of the median 
savings rate by ventile of the income distribution. The median income per capita for each ventile 
                                                          
14 See the IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2016, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/. 
Accessed March 24, 2017. 
15 When digesting those results, it should be remembered that they assume that the income cutoffs 
defining the middle class remain unchanged at the median income levels observed in the EU countries in 
2013. To the extent that households in the EU experience income growth between 2013 and 2020, one 
could argue that the criteria for being classified as middle class in China should be revised upwards, 
which would reduce the projected share of the middle class in China in 2020.    
16 The savings rate is estimated to be equal to the average savings rate among individuals.  Each 
individual’s savings rate is equal to its household savings rate.  For each household, the savings rate is 
calculated as household disposable income minus consumption expenditures, divided by household 
disposable income.   
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is shown on the horizontal axis. The vertical lines delineate between the poor and the lower 
classes and between the lower and the middle classes. The median savings rate is negative for the 
poor, increases from about 10 percent to 30 percent through the lower class, and then reaches 
35‒40 percent for the middle class. Figure 3.3 indicates that expansion of the middle class may 
not lead to a rising rate of consumption out of income, although the absolute level of 
consumption might nevertheless increase.   
[Figure 3.3 about here] 
In the remainder of this section, we examine five sets of characteristics: a.) sources of 
income, b.) housing and ownership of consumer durables, c.) location of residence, d.) 
demographic and education characteristics, and e.) membership in the Communist Party. We find 
that the middle class is distinct along many, but not all, of these dimensions.   
Figure 3.4 shows the average composition of income for the middle class and each of the 
other income classes in 2013.17  The middle and upper classes differ from the poor and lower 
classes in terms of the importance of income from wage employment.  For the middle and upper 
classes, wages contribute on average more than one-half of the total income.   
[Figure 3.4 about here] 
For the middle class, pensions are also a significant source of income, contributing 15 
percent of income, compared to 9 percent for the lower class and only 5 to 6 percent for the poor 
and upper classes.  Since pensions are typically linked to past employment, this further 
underscores the central role of employment as a source of income for the middle class.  Together, 
wage and pension income account for 67 percent of middle-class income, as compared to about 
50 percent for the upper and lower classes and only 18 percent for the poor.  We note, however, 
                                                          
17 We calculate the share of income by income component for each household, and then we take the 
average of the shares over the households in each income class.  Consequently, the shares reported in the 
figures do not add up to 100 percent.   
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that the heavy reliance of the middle class on employment for income has declined over time.  
Analysis of the 2007 data reveals that six years earlier the sum of wages plus pensions 
constituted a substantially larger share (80 percent) of middle-class income.   
The middle class also differs from other classes in terms of the relative unimportance of 
income from household businesses.  In 2013 business income on average accounted for 14 
percent of middle-class income.  For the other classes, business income was noticeably more 
important, in all cases higher than 20 percent of income.  We conclude that China’s middle class 
is, in general, a salaried rather than an entrepreneurial class.  Business income is most 
concentrated in the rich and poor classes.   
[Table 3.7 about here] 
Table 3.7 shows housing characteristics and ownership of consumer durables by class.  
The differences in housing among the classes show up very clearly in the market rental values of 
their housing (self-reported). On average, middle-class individuals live in housing that is valued 
more than three times that of the housing of the lower class, and almost ten times that of the 
housing of the poor.  The upper class, however, lives in housing with an average rental value that 
is double that of the middle class.  Housing conditions, as measured by the presence of piped 
water and a flush toilet, are nearly universal for the middle and upper classes but not so for the 
lower and poor classes.  Fuel used for cooking also differs considerably.  Exceedingly few 
middle- and upper-class individuals use firewood or coal for cooking, as compared to one-third 
of the lower class and two-thirds of the poor individuals. 
With respect to consumer durables, ownership of the two major household appliances, 
refrigerators and washing machines, is widespread among the upper, middle, lower, and even 
poor classes. Large differences emerge, however, with respect to other durables. Most of the 
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middle class owns air conditioners and a computer with internet connections. These items are 
almost universal for the upper class but are not typical for the two lower classes. Almost one in 
two middle-class individuals lives in a household that owns a personal car; however, car 
ownership is unusual among the lower classes.  In terms of ownership of consumer durables, 
then, China’s middle class is somewhat distinct from China’s lower classes and resembles the 
middle classes in the developed world.   
[Table 3.8 about here] 
China’s middle class is geographically concentrated (Table 3.8); 90 percent of middle- 
class persons are urban residents (including migrants).  Similarly, 90 percent of the upper class is 
urban.  In comparison, 85 percent of the poor are rural residents. Regionally, the middle classes 
are concentrated in the East.  Three out of five middle-class persons live in the East, as compared 
to only one out of five of the poor.  The upper class is even more concentrated in the East than 
the middle class.   
The geographic distribution of China’s middle class is related to the spatial variations in 
levels of economic development and urbanization. To investigate this relationship, we calculate 
the share of the middle class in each of the fourteen provinces covered by the 2013 CHIP survey 
and plot it against the provincial per capita GDP, the provincial average disposable household 
income per capita (as reported by the NBS in its statistical yearbooks), and the provincial rate of 
urbanization (Figure 3.5). The graphs show the expected relations:  the size of the middle class 
increases with the provincial per capita GDP, the provincial average household income, and the 
level of urbanization.  
[Figure 3.5 about here] 
28 
 
Note that Beijing is an outlier located far in the northeast corner of all the graphs.  Not 
only does Beijing have a substantially higher GDP per capita, income per capita, and 
urbanization than the other thirteen provinces, it also has a markedly larger middle class.  The 
share of the middle class in Beijing exceeds 50 percent, as compared to 30 percent for second-
place Jiangsu. This gap in the size of the middle class between Beijing and the other provinces 
reveals that impressions of China’s income distribution based on its capital city present a 
misleading picture of the importance of the middle class in China as a whole.       
[Table 3.9 about here] 
With respect to demographic variables, the middle class is not very different from the 
other classes (Table 3.9). China’s ethnic minorities are less frequently represented among the 
middle class than among the other classes. Children make up a slightly smaller proportion and 
adults make up a slightly larger proportion of the middle class than that in the overall population. 
Education levels are relatively high for adults in the middle class, at 11.7 years, as compared to 
8.7 years for the lower class and 7.6 years for the poor.  In other words, completion of high 
school is typical for adults in the middle class, as compared to completion of junior middle 
school for adults in the lower and poor classes. Adults in the upper class, however, have 
completed on average 13 years of education. 
[Table 3.10 about here] 
Communist Party membership is highest in the middle class.  Table 3.10 shows that not 
less than one in five middle-class persons is a Party member, compared with 16 percent of the 
upper class and less than 10 percent of the lower class and the poor.  Party membership is also 
most prevalent among formal urban residents.  Among China’s urban middle class, almost one in 
four is a Party member. 
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To what extent is the Communist Party a middle-class party?  Table 3.11 shows the class 
composition of Communist Party members. Overall, the majority of Party members (58 percent) 
belong to the lower class; however, a substantial minority (40 percent) is middle class.  In rural 
areas, Party membership is dominated by the lower class; in urban areas, Party membership 
contains roughly equal shares of the middle and lower classes.  Together, the lower and middle 
classes comprise 97 percent of Party members; the upper class and the poor account for the 
exceedingly small remainder. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
 
In this study, we propose a definition of the middle class based on household income per capita, 
with reference to notions of the middle class in the developed countries.  The middle class is 
defined as having a per capita income that is high enough not to be classified as poor and low 
enough not to be classified as upper class if living in Europe. The cutoff for belonging to the 
middle class is 60 percent of the median income, and the cutoff for belonging to the upper class 
is 200 percent of the median income in fifteen EU countries as observed in 2013.  We subdivide 
those with incomes below the middle-class cutoff into two groups.  The poor are defined as those 
living in a household with a disposable income that is below PPP US$ 2 per day. The lower class 
consists of people with a per capita income above PPP US$ 2 per day but not high enough to be 
classified as middle class.   
Using these definitions, we measure the sizes of the middle and other income classes in 
China in 2002, 2007, and 2013, and we trace the changes in their relative importance over 
China’s period of substantial economic growth. We find that during this eleven-year period, the 
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size of the middle class in China grew extremely rapidly, rising from 12 million people to 254 
million people, at an average rate exceeding 30 percent per year. By 2013, then, the absolute size 
of China’s middle class was large, equivalent to 80 percent of the population of the United 
States. 
This expansion of the middle class was accompanied by a change in the shape of China’s 
income distribution from a distinct pyramid shape toward an olive shape but still with a marked 
peak in the share of the population that falls in the lower-income class, which, at 77 percent of 
the population, remained by far China’s largest class in 2013. Despite the rapid expansion of the 
middle class, in 2013 the middle still constituted a relatively small share—only 20 percent—of 
China’s population.    
China’s middle class is very much an urban phenomenon. Most of China’s middle-class 
persons are urban residents. Most of the rural population belongs to the lower-income class. A 
clear majority of China’s poor live in the rural areas.     
We have investigated how the characteristics of the middle class compare to those of the 
other classes using data from 2013. The middle class earns most of its income from wage 
employment and it is less involved in business and self-employment than the poorer classes.  
Variations among the classes across some demographic variables are modest. Children, adults, 
and the elderly make up proportions of the middle class that are similar to those of the overall 
population. Education levels are noticeably higher for adults in the middle class than for those in 
the lower and poor classes. We have found that the middle class is politically well integrated in 
the sense that as many as one in five persons in the middle class is a member of the Communist 
Party, a considerably higher proportion than among the lower-income class and the poor.  
Nevertheless, the Communist Party continues to be largely made up of lower-class individuals. 
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Looking ahead, we project that if household incomes grow at a uniform average rate of 
6.5 percent per annum from 2013 to 2020, the proportion Chinese households that are classified 
as middle class will almost double by 2020, reaching over 500 million and accounting for about 
one-third of the population. If such an expansion occurs, which is not unlikely given recent and 
expected rates of China’s GDP growth, then by 2020 Chinese will become the single largest 
nationality in the global middle class. It is not unreasonable to assume that this quantitative 
expansion will have consequences in terms of the evolution of the tastes and habits of middle-
class consumers in other countries.  We note, however, that China’s population will continue to 
belong predominately to the global lower-income class. 
It has been observed that growth of the middle class is important for China’s shift from 
an investment-led to a consumption-led growth model.  In fact, we find that China’s middle-class 
households are large savers, saving on average more than one-third of their income and with 
savings rates higher than those of the lower classes.  Consequently, the expansion of China’s 
middle class may not necessarily be an engine of consumption growth and could conceivably 
hinder China’s shift to a consumption-led growth model unless it is accompanied by other 
changes that alter savings behavior. Nevertheless, the expansion of China’s middle class will 
reflect rising absolute incomes, so that even if the share of income spent on consumption 
declines, the absolute levels of consumption will rise.  In addition, the composition of 
consumption will likely change as the level of demand for items associated with middle-class 
consumption in China (and elsewhere), such as housing improvements, household appliances, 
electronic equipment, and automobiles, increases.   
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Appendix. Alternative estimates of the size and growth of the Chinese middle class using 
moving goal posts 
 
Here we report the outcome of an alternative approach to define the Chinese middle class 
whereby the cutoffs for the middle class are updated over time (“moving goal posts”). For the 
year 2013 we use the same definition of middle class as in the main body of this chapter. For 
earlier years, instead of adjusting the 2013 middle-class cutoffs back in time using the consumer 
price index for rural and urban China, respectively, we set the cutoffs equal to 60 percent and 
200 percent of the median income in fifteen EU countries, as observed in 2002 and 2007. The 
median real income in fifteen EU countries increased between 2002 and 2007 as well as between 
2007 and 2013, which means that the alternative cutoffs are lower than those in the main body of 
this chapter, which are all based on the 2013 median incomes.  The alternative cutoffs are 
presented in Table A3.1.   
Table A3.1. Alternative class cutoffs:  Updated over time (moving goal posts) 
 USD: 
     2002(2001) 2007 2013 
cutoff between the poor and the lower class  US$ 2/day US$ 2/day US$ 2/day 
cutoff between the lower class and the middle class US$ 26/day US$ 31/day US$ 36/day 
cutoff between the middle class and the upper class US$ 86/day US$ 105/day US$ 120/day 
RMB: 
   
  2002(2001) 2007 2013 
cutoff between the poor and the lower class  7.1 7.0 7.52 
cutoff between the lower class and the middle class 92.3 108.5 135.36 
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cutoff between the middle class and the upper class 305.3 367.5 451.2 
Notes. The first cutoff is set close to the World Bank’s global poverty line. The second cutoff is set at 60 
percent of the median income per equivalized person for the fifteen EU countries that prevailed in each of 
the three years. The third cutoff is set at 200 percent of the median income per equivalized person from 
the fifteen EU countries that prevailed in each of the three years.  Because Eurostat did not publish 
information on the median income of European countries in 2002, for 2002 we use the median income for 
2001. Data for the median income of the fifteen EU countries is from Eurostat. US dollars are converted 
to RMB using the PPP exchange rate. 
 
The alternative estimates of the sizes of the middle class and the other classes for 2002 
and 2007 based on these alternative cutoffs are shown in Table A3.2. By definition, the estimates 
for 2013 are the same as those used in the body of this chapter.   
A comparison of the estimates in Table A3.2 and our base estimates, as shown in Table 
3.3 in the body of the chapter, reveals a very minor difference for the year 2002. For example, 
the size of the middle class in China based on the alternative cutoffs is 1.2 percent instead of 1.0 
percent according to our base estimates. More differences between the alternative and the base 
estimates are observed for 2007.  Under the alternative cutoffs, in 2007 7.8 percent of the 
Chinese population would be middle class, as compared to 4.8 percent for our base estimates. 
The difference for 2007 is particularly noticeable in terms of the size of the middle class in urban 
China, which when using the alternative cutoffs is 20 percent of the urban population, as 
compared to 12 percent as reported in our base estimates.  
Thus, the alternative estimates give a larger expansion of the middle class from 2002 to 
2007. From this it follows that the expansion of the middle class between 2007 and 2013 using 
the alternative cutoffs was smaller than that for our base estimates.  This sensitivity analysis 
indicates that the timing of the expansion of the middle class from 2002 to 2013, especially in 
urban China, is somewhat sensitive to whether the cutoffs in all years are based on the median 
EU income in 2013 (fixed goal posts) or on the median EU incomes for each of the years 
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(moving goal posts); however, the magnitude of the expansion over the longer period from 2002 
to 2013 is not affected substantially. 
Table A3.2. The shares of the four classes in China, and among the urban, rural, and migrant populations 
calculated using the updated 2002/2007cutoffs (%) 
A: 2002 
    
  All urban rural migrants 
poor 40.2 4.4 59.5 13.3 
lower 58.6 92.5 40.2 85.4 
middle  1.2 3.1 0.2 1.3 
upper 0 0 0 0 
All 100 100 100 100 
B: 2007 
      All urban rural migrants 
poor 14.8  0.1  27.0  1.2  
lower 77.2  79.4  72.5  93.1  
middle  7.8  20.2 0.5  5.5 
upper 0.1 0.2 0.01  0.2  
All 100 100 100 100 
Notes. In the calculations for this table we allow the goal posts to change and we base the class cutoffs for 
2002 and 2007 on the median income in the fifteen EU countries in 2002 and 2007, respectively.  The 
cutoffs are shown in Table A3.1. 
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Table 3.1. Classification of income classes, with comparisons to the literature 
 
Classes Used in This 
Chapter 
Classes Used in the Literature:  
Developing World Frame of 
Reference 
Classes used in the Literature:   
Developed World Frame of 
Reference 
Poor Poor Ultra-poor 
Lower Vulnerable + middle Poor + vulnerable 
Middle Upper middle + upper Middle 
Upper Ultra-rich Upper + rich 
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Table 3.2. Cutoffs used in this study (per person per day, 2013 prices) 
 
  First Cutoff  Second Cutoff Third Cutoff 
  
Separating the poor 
from the lower class 
Separating the 
middle class from 
the lower class 
Separating the 
upper class from the 
middle class 
2013 RMB 7.52 135.36 451.20 
2013 USD 2.00 36.00 120.00 
Notes:  The first cutoff is set close to the World Bank’s global poverty line. The second cutoff is set at 60 
percent of the median income per equivalized person for fifteen EU countries in 2013. The third cutoff is 
set at 200 percent of the median income per equivalized person from fifteen EU countries in 2013.  Data 
for the median income of the fifteen EU countries are from Eurostat.  US dollars are converted to RMB 
using the PPP exchange rate.  For 2002 and 2007 the cutoffs are equal to the RMB cutoffs converted from 
the 2013 prices into the 2002 and 2007 prices using the urban and rural consumer price indexes, as 
published by the NBS. 
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Table 3.3. The size of the four income classes in China as a whole, and among the urban, 
rural and migrant populations, 2002, 2007, and 2013 (%) 
A: 2002 
    
 
all urban rural migrants 
poor 26.88 1.92 40.34 6.95 
lower 72.15 95.65 59.44 92.32 
middle 0.97 2.43 0.22 0.73 
upper 0 0 0 0 
all 100 100 100 100 
B:2007 
    
 
all urban rural migrants 
poor 11.3 0.09 20.58 1.05 
lower 81.44 81.21 78.97 93.96 
middle 7.16 18.49 0.44 4.74 
upper 0.10 0.21 0.01 0.24 
all 100 100 100 100 
C:2013 
    
 
all urban rural migrants 
poor 3.58 0.94 6.65 1.18 
lower 77.29 63.71 88.93 79.02 
middle 18.66 34.44 4.31 19.49 
upper 0.47 0.91 0.11 0.32 
all 100 100 100 100 
Notes: 
1) Calculated using weights.  With weights, the urban/rural/migrant population shares are as follows: 
2002: 33.65 percent /64.74 percent /1.60 percent; 2007: 34.51 percent/54.21 percent /11.28 percent; and 
2013: 40.93 percent/45.77 percent/13.30 percent.   
2) For 2002 and 2007 the cutoffs are equal to the RMB cutoffs in Table 3.2 converted from the 2013 
prices into the prices for 2002 and 2007 using the urban and rural consumer price indexes as published by 
the NBS. 
3) The first cutoff (between the poor and the lower class) is applied to income per capita (equal to 
household income divided by the number of persons in the household).  The second and third cutoffs are 
applied to the equivalized income per capita (equal to the household income divided by the number of 
equivalent individuals in the household, see the text). 
4) Here and elsewhere, we do not use spatial price deflators to control for the differences in prices 
between the rural and urban areas and among the provinces. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data. 
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Table 3.4. Estimates of the Chinese middle class in the literature 
 
Author(s) 
Definition of 
the middle 
class 
Year of 
measurement Data 
Size of the middle class (% of population) 
Rural Urban Migrants All of China 
Kharas (2010)  
10‒100 USD 
per person per 
day 
2009 
Merging 
information on 
household 
income data for 
deciles with 
national account 
data on mean 
expenditures  
NE NE NE Less than 12 percent 
Bonnefond, Clément, 
and Combarnous (2015)  
Four different 
definitions, 
with a 
preference for 
10,000 RMB 
per person per 
year to the 
95th 
percentile 
1989‒2009 
China Health and 
Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) 
      
Approximately 
50 percent of 
the urban 
households in 
2009 may be 
said to belong 
to the middle 
class  
Yuan, Wan, and Khor 
(2012) 
4‒10 USD per 
person per day 
1988 
CHIP 
3 NE NE NE 
1995 5    
2002 15    
2007 53    
Chen and Qin (2014)      
(“upper middle class”) 
10‒20 USD 
PPP per 
person per day 
1995 CHIP <0.5 2 NE 1 
2002 CHIP <1 3 2 2 
2010 
China Family 
Panel Survey 
(CFPS)  
5 14 10 8 
2012  CFPS 9 20 14 13 
This study  
36‒120 USD 
per person and 
day 
2002 
CHIP 
< 0.5 3 1 1 
2007 <0.5 12 6 7 
2013 4 34 20 19 
Notes:  NE=not estimated.  Estimates by Chen and Qin (2014) refer to consumption, not income, and the 
percentage of households, not individuals.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
42 
 
Table 3.5a. The simulated shares of the four classes in 2013, assuming that all individuals’ 
incomes grew at the same rate between 2007 and 2013 (%)  
  Total Urban Rural Migrants 
poor 4.01 0.02 7.25 0.68 
lower 76.38 53.16 90.62 79.01 
middle 18.71 44.57 2.08 19.49 
upper 0.90 2.25 0.05 0.83 
all 100 100 100 100% 
Notes:  This simulation yields a hypothetical distribution of income for 2013 that assumes income grew at 
the same rate for all persons and there was no redistribution of income between 2007 and 2013. To 
calculate the simulated shares, we start with the 2007 distribution of income and assume that from 2007 to 
2013 all persons experienced the same annual rate of income growth.  We use a uniform income growth 
rate of 7.97 percent, which is equal to the average annual rate of growth of household income per capita 
during this period. The urban/rural/migrant population shares are assumed to remain unchanged at their 
2007 values. This yields the simulated income for each equivalent person in 2013. Using the cutoffs 
shown in Table 3.2, we then obtain the share of the population in each class.   
 
 
Table 3.5b. The simulated shares of the four classes in 2007, assuming that all individuals’ 
incomes grew at the same rate between 2002 and 2007 (%) 
  Total Urban Rural Migrants 
poor 6.16 0.13 9.38 2.54 
lower 87.59 83.77 89.5 90.24 
middle 6.19 15.9 1.11 7.11 
upper 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.11 
all 100 100 100 100 
Notes:  This simulation yields a hypothetical distribution of income for 2007 that assumes income grew at 
the same rate for all persons and there was no redistribution of income between 2002 and 2007. To 
calculate the simulated shares, we start with the 2002 distribution of income and assume that from 2002 to 
2007 all persons experienced the same annual rate of income growth.  We use a uniform income growth 
rate of 14.71 percent, which is equal to the average annual rate of growth of household income per capita 
during this period. The urban/rural/migrant population shares are assumed to remain unchanged at their 
2002 values. This yields the simulated income for each equivalent person in 2007. Using the cutoffs 
shown in Table 3.2, we then obtain the share of the population in each class.  
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Table 3.6. The simulated shares of the four classes in 2020, assuming that all individuals’ 
incomes grew at the same rate between 2013 and 2020 (%) 
 
  All Urban Rural Migrants 
poor 1.70 0.65 2.86 0.95 
lower 59.81 34.36 84.20 54.21 
middle 36.18 60.31 12.50 43.43 
upper 2.31 4.69 0.43 1.41 
all 100 100 100 100 
Notes: This simulation yields a hypothetical distribution of income for 2020 based on the assumption that 
income grew at the same rate for all persons, and there was no redistribution of income. To calculate the 
simulated shares, we start with the 2013 distribution of income and assume that from 2013 to 2020 all 
persons experienced the same annual 6.5 percent rate of income growth. The urban/rural/migrant 
population shares are assumed to remain unchanged at their 2013 values. This yields the simulated 
income for each equivalent person in 2013. Using the cutoffs shown in Table 3.2, we then obtain the 
share of the population in each class. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data. 
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Table 3.7. Housing and ownership of consumer durables by income class, 2013 
  Total Poor Lower Middle Upper 
Estimated monthly market rent 
of dwelling (RMB) 797 202 533 1 917 3901 
Piped water in dwelling (%) 82.9 50.4 80.4 98.8 97.0 
Flush toilet in dwelling (%)  60.9 20.9 54.6 94.2 94.9 
Ownership of refrigerator (%)  82.6 54.0 80.7 95.4 97.9 
Ownership of washing machine 
(%) 84.3 69.2 82.2 95.4 100.0 
Ownership of air conditioner 
(%) 47.5 19.8 41.3 77.5 84.6 
Main fuel for cooking is 
firewood or coal (%) 27.6 66.2 32.2 2.1 2.4 
Ownership of computer 
connected to the Internet (%) 40.6 14.0 33.8 72.9 81.8 
Ownership of private car (%) 20.2 9.3 14.6 44.2 74.3 
Sources: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data; calculated using weights. Means are calculated over 
individuals in each class. 
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Table 3.8. Composition of the income classes by location in 2013 (%) 
  Total Poor Lower class Middle class Upper class 
Sector      Urban 40.9 10.7 33.7 75.5 80.3 
Rural  45.8 84.9 52.7 10.6 10.6 
Migrants 13.3 4.4 13.6 13.9 9.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Region      East 41.5 20.9 37.6 60.4 85.4 
Central  31.5 34.6 34.0 21.0 9.9 
West 27.0 44.5 28.4 18.6 4.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Sources: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data using weights. Calculated over individuals.  
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Table 3.9. Composition of the classes by demographic variables in 2013  
Table 3.9-1: All 
     All Poor Lower Middle Upper 
Ethnicity (%)      Han  93.1 87.2 92.8 95.6 92.4 
Minority  6.9 12.8 7.2 4.4 7.6 
Age group (%)      Child  15.1 17.3 15.4 13.4 16.4 
Adult 75.9 72.6 75.6 77.1 79.9 
Elderly  9.0 10.1 9.0 8.9 3.7 
Average education among 
adults (years) 9.3 7.6 8.7 11.7 13.0 
      Table 3.9-2:  Urban (including migrants) 
      All Poor Lower Middle Upper 
Ethnicity (%)      Han 94.5 89.7 94.0 95.8 91.5 
Minority 5.5 10.3 6.0 4.2 8.5 
Age group (%)      Child 14.9 15.1 15.5 13.6 16.3 
Adult 76.3 75.0 75.8 77.3 79.9 
Elderly 8.8 9.9 8.7 9.2 3.8 
Average education among 
adults (years) 10.5 9.1 9.7 12.0 13.3 
      Table 3.9-3: Rural 
      All Poor Lower Middle  
Ethnicity (%)      Han 91.5 86.7 91.8 93.7  
Minority 8.5 13.3 8.2 6.3  
Age group (%)      Child 15.3 17.7 15.3 12.3  
Adult 75.5 72.1 75.5 81.3  
Elderly 9.2 10.2 9.3 6.4  
Average education among 
adults (years) 7.8 7.3 7.7 9.4  
Notes: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data.  Calculated over individuals. Ethnicity is based on the 
ethnicity information of each person, not the ethnicity of the household head. Age groups are defined as 
follows: children (age<16); adults (16<=age<=65); elderly (age>65). The number of rural upper-class 
observations in the sample is extremely small, so we do not report the rural upper-class characteristics.  
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Table 3.10. Membership in the Chinese Communist Party by class and by urban/rural/migrant 
in 2013 (%) 
  All Poor Lower Middle Upper 
Total  9.1 4.2 6.7 19.5 16.4 
Rural  4.7 3.4 4.7 7.7 - 
Migrants 2.7 0.0 2.3 4.9 - 
Urban 16.0 11.5 11.8 23.8 - 
Notes: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data, with weights.  The percentages refer to the share of 
individuals who are members of the Communist Party. “All” includes all four classes. Due to the small 
number of upper-class observations in the sample and thus the very few in each sector, we do not report 
the breakdown for the upper class by urban/rural/migrant. 
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Table 3.11.  Communist Party members belonging to each class in 2013 (%) 
  All Poor Lower Middle Upper 
total 100 1.7 57.5 39.9 0.9 
rural 100 4.9 87.8 7.0 - 
migrant 100 0.0 65.3 34.0 - 
urban 100 0.7 47.0 51.1 - 
Notes: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data, with weights.  The percentages refer to the share of 
individuals who are members of the Communist Party. “All” includes all four classes. Due to the small 
number of upper-class observations in the sample and thus the very few in each sector, we do not report 
the breakdown for the upper class by urban/rural/migrant. 
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Figure 3.1.  China’s income distribution in 2002, 2007, and 2013 (RMB per equivalized 
person per day) 
 
Notes:  Income in all years is expressed in 2013 constant prices.  Authors’ calculations using the CHIP 
data, with weights. 
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Figure 3.2. Cumulative distributions of income for China as a whole, urban China, and rural 
China, 2002, 2007, and 2013 (RMB per equivalized person per day)  
 
 
 
Notes:  Income in all years is expressed in 2013 constant prices.  Authors’ calculations using the CHIP 
data, with weights. 
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Figure 3.3.  Savings rate by ventile in the income distribution, 2013 
 
Notes:  Each bar gives the median savings rate for each ventile (5 percentile group) in the income 
distribution.  Labels on the horizontal axis are the median income of each ventile (in RMB).  The vertical 
lines indicate the income cutoffs between the classes.  No cutoff is shown between the middle and upper 
classes because the upper class constitutes only 0.47 percent of the population and thus is a small 
component of the top ventile.  Authors’ calculations using the CHIP data, with weights. 
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Figure 3.4. The composition of income by class, 2013 
 
Note:  Authors’ calculations using the CHIP data, with weights.  
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pension income 5.0% 9.3% 15.4% 6.0%
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Figure 3.5. The size of the middle class by province plotted against provincial GDP per capita, 
household disposable income per capita, and the rate of urbanization, 2013 (%) 
 
Notes:  Provincial GDP per capita, NBS disposable income per capita, and the share of the urban 
population are based on statistics published by the NBS.  Provincial shares of the middle class are 
calculated by the authors using the CHIP data, with weights. 
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